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Lesley A. Stout
INTRODUCTION
N April of 2007, Diana Levine visited her local clinic to receive treatment
for a migraine headache.2 She received an initial injection of Phenergan
for nausea and Demerol for her headache.3 After her symptoms failed to
subside, Levine returned for a second visit, where she received Phenergan
by a method referred to as "the IV-push method," by which the drug is
administered into a vein.4 Injection of the drug through an intravenous
drip or intramuscular injection has been found to be safe; however,
injection into a vein carries serious risks. I In Levine's case, the effort to
inject the drug into her vein punctured an artery, and the drug traveled into
her arterial blood resulting in the spread of gangrene and the amputation of
her arm.6 Levine subsequently filed suit against Wyeth, the brand-name
manufacturer of Phenergan, based on common-law negligence and strict
liability theories.' While the Phenergan label warned of the complications
associated with inadvertent intra-arterial injection,8 she alleged that the
i J.D. expected May 2010, University of Kentucky College of Law; M.Phii. in
International Relations, May 2oo6, University of Cambridge; B.A. in International Relations,
May 2002, Centre College. The author would like to thank Lou Bogard for his assistance.
2 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2oo9).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Effect ofFD.A. ApprovalofDrugLabels on Suits in State Courts,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2oo8, at A2o.
6 Adam Liptak, Drug Label, Maimed Patient and Crucial Testfor Justices, N.Y. TIMWS, Sept.
19, 2o8, at Ai.
7 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 191.
8 Id. at 1192 n.i (reproducing the label as it appeared at the time of Levine's injury,
as follows: "The warning for 'Inadvertent Intra-arterial Injection' stated: 'Due to the close
proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly used for intravenous injection,
extreme care should be exercised to avoid perivascular extravasation or inadvertent intra-ar-
terial injection. Reports compatible with inadvertent intra-arterial injection of Phenergan
Injection, usually in conjunction with other drugs intended for intravenous use, suggest that
pain, severe chemical irritation, severe spasm of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene requir-
ing amputation are likely under such circumstances. Intravenous injection was intended in
all the cases reported but perivascular extravasation or arterial placement of the needle is
now suspect. There is no proven successful management of this condition after it occurs....
Aspiration of dark blood does not preclude intra-arterial needle placement, because blood is
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labeling was defective nevertheless "because it failed to instruct clinicians
to use the IV-drip method of intravenous administration instead of the
higher risk IV-push method." 9  In response, Wyeth argued "Levine's
failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal law," relying on theories
of implied field and conflict preemption. 1° Wyeth maintained it could not
comply with both federal and state law and therefore state law must yield
to federal law."
Ms. Levine's case and the issue of federal preemption made its way to
the United States Supreme Court in November of 2008, with the Court
handing down its decision on March 4, 2009. 1 The Supreme Court agreed
with Levine and held that Wyeth failed to show that it was impossible
to comply with both federal and state requirements or that complying
with state law would frustrate federal objectives. 3 The regulations in
place permitted the company to "unilaterally strengthen its warning" and
Levine's state common-law actions were not preempted by federal law.
14
The fact that Wyeth had previously received Food and DrugAdministration
(FDA) approval for the warning label did not excuse the company's failure
to maintain an adequate warning label.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine provides critical
guidance to brand-name drug manufacturers in evaluating their
responsibilities and potential liabilities under federal and state laws. It also
ensures that consumers injured by brand-name drugs may pursue causes of
action under state common law. However, the case leaves unanswered the
preemption question with respect to generic drug manufacturers. While
the statutory rules and regulations governing the labeling of generic and
brand-name drugs are similar, they are not identical."5 The differences
between the two processes have led to sharp disagreements over the ability
of generic drug manufacturers to update and strengthen their warning
labels independently of brand-name manufacturers.
discolored upon contact with Phenergan Injection. Use of syringes with rigid plungers or of
small bore needles might obscure typical arterial backflow if this is relied upon alone. When
used intravenously, Phenergan Injection should be given in a concentration no greater than
25 mg per mL and at a rate not to exceed 25 mg per minute. When administering any irritant
drug intravenously, it is usually preferable to inject it through the tubing of an intravenous in-
fusion set that is known to be functioning satisfactorily. In the event that a patient complains
of pain during intended intravenous injection of Phenergan Injection, the injection should be
stopped immediately to provide for evaluation of possible arterial placement or perivascular
extravasation."').
9 Id. at 119z.
io Id.
ii Id. at 1196.
12 Id. at 1187.
13 Id. at i 199.
14 Id.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 78-88.
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Courts across the country are addressing questions presented by the
constitutional issue of federal preemption. 6 When, and to what extent,
do federal laws supersede and prevent the application of state laws on a
given issue? The central question with respect to preemption in the case of
generic drugs is as follows: should state common-law tort claims based on a
failure to warn be permitted when generic drug manufacturers' labels have
been approved by the FDA and yet are shown to be inadequate? This
Note will show that state common-law tort claims should not be barred
based on federal preemption.
The FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research generally defines
a generic drug as "a drug product that is equivalent to brand name products
in terms of quality and performance."' 7 The D.C. Circuit Court in Mova
PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Shalala described generic drugs as "versions of brand-
name prescription drugs that are often sold without a brand name and that
contain the same active ingredients, but not necessarily the same inactive
ingredients, as the original."' 8 When seeking FDA approval, generic drugs
use the same warning labels as those borne by the brand-name drugs they
replicate without performing additional testing or studies.19 Because of the
unique process by which generic drug labels are approved and modified,"°
questions arise with regard to how far generic drug manufacturers may go
in altering their labels.
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Wyeth v. Levine
pertaining to the federal preemption of brand-name pharmaceuticals,
a number of courts have relied on it in deciding cases involving the
preemption of generic drug claims. In Kellogg v. Wyeth, the United States
District Court for the District of Vermont looked to Wyeth v. Levine in
denying the defendant generic drug manufacturer's motion for immediate
appeal based on the court's prior decision denying preemption."1 In Schrock
v. Wyeth, Inc., the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma relied on Levine when it found that the plaintiff's state law
16 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land ..
. ."). For an overview of the preemption debate in various areas of the law, see FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve
eds., 2007). See also Alicia Mundy & Brent Kendall, Shift Toward State Rules on Product Liability,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009, at A3.
17 FDA, FAQs about CDER, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices (follow
"About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research" hyperlink; then follow "FAQs about
CDER" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
18 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 E3d io6o, io63 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing United
States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453,454-55 (1983)).
19 See, e.g., Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (E.D. La. zoo8), aff'd,
Demahy v.Actavis, No. 08-31204, 2oio WL 46513 (5th Cir. Jan. 8,2010).
20 See 21 U.S.C. § 355() (2oo6).
21 Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 E. Supp. 2d 437, 441-42 (D. Vt. 2009).
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failure-to-warn claim was not preempted by federal drug labeling law and
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on preemption grounds." In
addition, the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois in Stacel v.
Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, also looked to Levine in holding that the plaintiff's
state law causes of action against a generic drug manufacturer were not
preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).3 In
yet another turn of events following Levine, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., relied on Levine when it vacated
a judgment in which it had previously found preemption and dismissed
claims against both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. 4
Despite the proliferation of scholarly articles addressing questions of
preemption and brand-name drugs,"5 little to no attention has been paid
to questions involving generic drugs. This Note attempts to fill that void
and addresses the following issues: Assuming the brand-name drug's label
meets FDA specifications, is the defense of "implied conflict preemption"
strengthened for generic manufacturers because of the FDA regulations
requiring generics to maintain identical labeling to those of the brand-
name drugs they replicate? Are regulations that require a brand-name
manufacturer to update a label also available to generic drug manufacturers?
Must the labels of the brand-name drug and generic drug be identical at all
times, or is even a temporary discrepancy grounds for a drug being deemed
misbranded? Finally, what are the policy considerations associated with
permitting generic manufacturers to maintain the preemption defense?
When a drug injures a person as a result of an inadequate warning label,
the manufacturer of that drug should be held liable irrespective of whether
the manufacturer is the original brand-name company or a generic company
replicating both the chemical structure and the warning label of the
brand-name drug. The duty to update a drug's warning label following the
acquisition of new evidence pertaining to a drug's side effects or potential
for adverse health reactions should not rest solely with the brand-name
drug manufacturer, especially when FDA procedures exist for generic
manufacturers to update their warning labels. A drug's beneficial purposes
are compromised when doctors and patients are not fully informed as to
the dangers associated with prescribing it. Moreover, what benefit does an
inexpensive drug with an inadequate warning provide when the effects of
its use could be more harmful than not using it in the first place?
22 Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 6o E Supp. 2d 1262, 1265-67 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
23 Stacel v. Teva Pharms., USA, 62o F. Supp. 2d 899, 907 (N.D. II. 2009); see also Bartlett
v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 659 E Supp. zd 279 (D.N.H. zoo9).
24 Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., No. o6--3107 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2oo9) [not yet available on
LexisNexis or Westlaw].
25 See generally Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and
the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2oo7); Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State
Laws in Drug Cases, io3 Nw. U. L. REv. 463 (2009).
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Part I of this Note will detail the generic drug approval history and
process. Part II will examine the principles of preemption and recent
questions presented by the generic drug labeling debate. Part III will set
forth the case against federal preemption and explain why generic drug
manufacturers should not escape liability for failure to update their labels
and warn consumers of the risks associated with the use of their drugs.
Part IV will explain the arguments in favor of preemption and why courts
should ultimately reject these arguments. Finally, Part V will discuss the
policy implications of preventing generic manufacturers from claiming the
defense of federal preemption when faced with state common-law tort
claims.
The importance of the preemption debate will only increase as the
number of generic drug manufacturers seeking approval for new drugs
continues to rise, with more than two hundred brand-name medications
coming off-patent over the next few years.16 According to the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, generic drugs account for sixty-nine percent
of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States. 7 Moreover, the generic
industry is growing at a rate of more than seven percent, outstripping the
growth rate for the world pharmaceutical market.2" With such high growth
numbers, it follows that the number of injuries associated with generic
drugs will also rise. Thus, an increased need exists for consumers to be
able to hold the correct manufacturer responsible for the failure to warn of
dangers and to ensure manufacturers are aware of their responsibilities and
potential liabilities.
I. THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
To understand the current debate over preemption and generic drugs,
one must first examine a brief history of the drug approval process and
how that process incorporates the approval of generic drugs. While
efforts to protect consumers against misbranded or fraudulent food and
drug products began in the states even before the twentieth century,
federal efforts to create a national system for regulating food and drugs
moving in interstate commerce only came to pass in 1906 with the
passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act.29 In 1938, Congress enacted
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).30 Since its initial
26 See Mark B. McClellan, Remarks of the Commissioner of Food andDrugs, 58 FoOD & DRUG
L.J. 191,198 (2003).
27 Facts at a Glance, Generic Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.gphaonline.org/
about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Jan. 6, 2oo).
28 Id.
z9 See Davis, supra note 25, at io99- ioo (citing I J~Ams T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION §§ 3:1-:4 (2d ed. 2005)).
30 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 78-717,52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codi-
2009-201o]
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passage, changing industry practices and standards led Congress to
broaden the scope of the legislation, resulting in the federal regulation
of all aspects of pharmaceutical drug manufacturing and marketing.3
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which
amended the FDCA.3 Congress undertook these changes in order to slow
rising drugs costs and increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs.33
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments resulted in an expedited approval process
for generic drugs, while lengthening patent terms for innovator drugs.3"
According to the Congressional Budget Office, in 1994 alone,
purchasers saved roughly $8 to $10 billion by substituting generic for
brand-name drugs.35 These reductions in cost are directly attributable
to the expedited approval process for generic drugs.' Under the
FDCA, brand-name drug manufacturers must complete a New Drug
Application (NDA) with the FDA.37 Prior to passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, manufacturers of generic versions of FDA-
approved brand-name drugs were likewise required to file new NDAs,
including new studies documenting a drug's safety and effectiveness.3"
fled as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2oo6)).
31 Jodie M. Gross & Judi Abbott Curry, The Federal Preemption Debate in Pharmaceutical
Labeling Product Liability Actions, 43 TORT TkIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 35, 43 (2oo8) (arguing in
favor of finding federal preemption in cases involving brand-name drugs); see also Drug
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962); Michelle Meadows, Promoting
Safe and Effective Drugs for 1oo Years, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 2006, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/CentennialofFDA/CentennialEditionofFDAConsumer/
ucm093787.htm (noting with respect to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments that "[b]efore
marketing a drug, firms now had to prove not only safety, but also provide substantial evidence
of effectiveness for the product's intended use" and "the 1962 amendments required that the
FDA specifically approve the marketing application before the drug could be marketed").
32 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman Amendments)
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). U.S. Representative Henry Waxman
and U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch sponsored the amendments, thus, the Act's commonly known
name.
33 See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 E Supp. 2d 421, 431-32 (D. Vt. 2oo8) (noting that "[tihere
can likewise be no dispute that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments were intended to facilitate
the availability of lower-cost generic drugs"); see also Jeff Thomas, Note, Schering-Plough and
In re Tamoxifen: LawfulRevere Payments in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
13, 13 (2007); Vaishali V. Shah, Note, Prescription Drugs in America: The Pain of Pricing Has an
Unpromising Cure, 2oo6 U. ILL. L. REV. 859,868 (2OO6).
34 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY iii (1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xxldoc655/pharm.pdf.
35 Id. at ix (these figures represent retail prices).
36 Id. at 43.
37 See 21 U.S.C. § 3 5 5 (a)-(i) (2oo6) for NDA requirements; see also Mova Pharm. Corp. v.
Shalala, 140 F3d Io6o, io63 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
38 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. I, at 16-17 (1984); see also Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F3d at
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This process changed under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.
Original, or pioneer, applicants for FDA approval must still file full
NDAs; however, manufacturers of generic versions of the original drug
may instead file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).39
This abbreviated application relies on the FDA's previous approval
of the original drug without requiring a new set of studies.4" It
mandates that the generic drug manufacturer establish the following:
(1) the generic drug is "bioequivalent" to the pioneer drug; (2) its active
ingredients, route of administration, strength and dosage form are "the
same as" those of the pioneer drug; and (3) the inactive ingredients are
not "unsafe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling proposed for the drug."
41
Generic manufacturers must also show that "the labeling proposed for the
new [generic] drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug
.. except for changes required .... because the new drug and the listed
drug are produced or distributed by different manufacturers.
4
While FDA regulations require that generic manufacturers use the same
labeling as that of the reference drug as part of the application process,
43
FDA regulations nevertheless do permit labeling differences with respect to
"expiration date, formulation, bioavailability, or pharmacokinetics, labeling
revisions made to comply with current FDA labeling guidelines or other
guidance, or omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected
by patent or accorded exclusivity under section 505(j)(4)(D) of the act."
44
As a result of the above regulations, generic drug manufacturers argue
that both during and after their initial application process their labels
must be the same as that of their brand-name counterparts.45 This Note
will show that the applicable statutes and regulations do not support
this contention, and generic drug manufacturers have a continuing duty,
independent of brand-name manufacturers, to ensure that their labels
reflect new information in an accurate and timely manner.
io63.
39 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J); see also Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 E3d at 1o63.
40 Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F3d at io63.
41 Zeneca, Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(4)(C),
(D), (H)).
42 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(2)(A)(v)).
43 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2009).
44 Id.
45 See Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 E Supp. zd 642,645 (E.D. La. zoo8), aff'd, Demahy v.
Actavis, No.08-31204, 201o WL 46513 (5th Cir. Jan. 8,2010).
2009-201ol
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II. PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES
As the Supreme Court originally set forth in Gade v. National
Solid Wastes Management Association, federal law has been found to
preempt state law in three situations: "(1) express preemption, where
a federal statute contains 'explicit preemptive language'; (2) field
preemption, in which the federal regulatory scheme is 'so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it'; and (3) implied conflict preemption. '
Under principles of implied field preemption, "federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."' 47 Under implied
conflict preemption, "state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts
with federal law." Conflict preemption exists in two situations: when
"it is impossible for a private parry to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
49
Impossibility and obstacle preemption arose as issues in Wyeth v.
Levine.s0 Wyeth, the brand-name drug manufacturer, argued that if it had
strengthened its warning to be in compliance with state law, it would
have found itself in violation of federal law based on the unauthorized
distribution of the drug and claims of misbranding. Thus, it argued it
was impossible for it to comply with both state and federal law."1 Wyeth
also attempted to argue obstacle preemption, stating that compliance
with state law would obstruct federal labeling requirements."2 Wyeth
maintained that Levine's state tort claims interfered with congressional
intent, which it argued gave expert agency officials the duty of making drug
labeling decisions.5 3 The Court saw this as an "untenable interpretation of
congressional intent and an overbroad view of an agency's power to pre-empt
state law."' The Court ultimately rejected both preemption arguments.
With respect to express preemption, the FDCA does not contain
a generally applicable express preemption provision dealing with
46 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows, 304 F3d 1197, 1205 (Ith Cir. 2002)
(citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,98 (1992)).
47 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Fid. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
48 Id.
49 Stacel v. Teva Pharms., USA, 62o F Supp. 2d 899, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
5o Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009).
51 Id. at 1196.
52 Id. at 1199.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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prescription drugs,"5 thereby preventing both brand-name and generic
drug manufacturers from claiming express preemption and leaving
the debate to claims centered on implied preemption. The FDCA
does include, however, an express preemption provision for medical
devices.5 6 When Congress enacted this provision in 1976, it elected
against inserting a similar provision for prescription drugs . 7 The
omission of an express preemption provision for drugs and the inclusion
of a provision for medical devices serve as important evidence of the
congressional intent not to preempt state common-law tort claims.-"
In the case of brand-name drugs, the FDA under the Bush Administration
publicly supported the implied preemption of state law claims.59 As for
generic drugs, the FDA took steps that suggested it supported preemption.
On January 16, 2008, the FDA issued a proposed rule, entitled
"Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices." 6 The FDA proposed this rule to
amend regulations regarding changes to an approved new drug application
(NDA) in order to codify its position that a supplemental application to
amend the labeling for an approved product is only necessary "to reflect newly
55 Davis, supra note 25, at 1092 (citing Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d
ioi8, 1035 (S.D. I11. 2001) (showing that the FDCA pharmaceutical provisions do not contain
preemption provisions)).
56 21 U.S.C. § 36ok(a) (20o6) (noting that "[eixcept as provided in subsection (b)..., no
State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement- (i) which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement appli-
cable to the device under this chapter").
57 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1zoo.
58 Id. (stating that "[i]f Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objec-
tives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the
FDCA's 7o-year history. But despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption provision
for medical devices, see § 521, 90 Stat. 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 36ok(a)), Congress has not
enacted such a provision for prescription drugs").
59 See Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial
Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 1-2, Motus v. Pfizer,
Inc., 358 F3d 659 (9th Cit. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084 ("The FDA
... has a clear interest to ensure that state tort law does not undermine the agency's authority
to protect the public health through enforcement of the FDCAs prohibition against false or
misleading labeling of drug products. To require a warning of a supposed danger that FDA
concludes has no actual scientific basis, no matter the warning's language, would be to require
a statement that would be false or misleading, and thus contrary to federal law. In such a case,
federal law must prevail. The United States files this amicus curiae brief.., to make clear the
basis for federal preemption and the error in the district court's opinion.").
6o Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848 (proposed Jan. 16, 2008) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 6o1, 814).
2009-201o]
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acquired information" or "to add or strengthen a contraindication, warning,
precaution, or adverse reaction."6 1 The 2008 Proposed Rule specifically
included the statement in a footnote that generic drug manufacturers
cannot utilize a procedure known as the Changes Being Effected (CBE)
mechanism.6 This procedure allows drug manufacturers to make unilateral,
post-approval labeling changes, subject to FDA notice and approval.'
Thus, a brand-name manufacturer who discovered evidence that suggested
a drug had an inadequate warning could, prior to FDA approval, utilize
the CBE procedure and change the label to indicate the new information.
Although only in a footnote, the FDA inserted the following statement:
"CBE [Changes Being Effected] changes are not available for generic
drugs approved under an abbreviated new drug application under
21 U.S.C. 355(j). To the contrary, a generic drug manufacturer is
required to conform to the approved labeling for the listed drug."
' 6
The proposed rule specifically excluded generic drugs from the CBE
requirement, thereby requiring that generic labels conform to the approved
label for the listed drug. The FDA, however, issued the final rule on
September 22, 2008, omitting the above reference to generic drugs.65 In
fact, the final rule does not mention generics or the ANDA approval process
for generic drugs.
The recent change in White House administration has brought about
a new position with respect to preemption. On April 28, 2009, the U.S.
Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, sent a letter to the
Clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit notifying the
court that, contrary to the previous administration's decision to participate
as amicus curiae in the generic drug case of Joseph C. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,
the new administration would not take a position on the case in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine.66 The Justice Department
stated: "The [FDA] has not yet conducted the sort of reexamination of
various preemption issues following the Supreme Court's decision in
[Wyeth] that would be necessary to inform a position of the United States in
this case."
67
Moreover, on May 20, 2009, President Obama released a memorandum
to the heads of all executive departments and agencies noting that
61 Id. The rule also dealt with changes to the biologics license application (BLA) and
medical device premarket approval application (PMA).
62 Id. at 2849 n. i.
63 Id. at 2849.
64 Id. at 2849 n.i (emphasis added).
65 21 C.FR. pts. 314, 6oi, 814 (2008).
66 Letter from Sharon Swingle, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Div., Appellate Staff, to Marcia
M. Waldron, Clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. z8, 2oo9), available
at http://druganddevicelaw.net/ (follow "DOJ-Letter.pdf" hyperlink).
67 Id.
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"preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should
be undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of
the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption." 6 The president
then proceeded to clarify that preemption provisions should not be included
in preambles alone without also being included in the corresponding
regulation, preemption provisions should only be included where legally
justified, and heads of departments and agencies should review regulations
from the past ten years to determine whether preemption provisions
were justified. 69  This statement reflects a move away from the previous
administration's public support for preemption. In addition, the Supreme
Court in Wyeth v. Levine noted that the FDA's position on preemption, at
least under the previous administration, was not entitled to deference. 70
III. THE CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION
A. Statutory Arguments Opposing Preemption
An examination of the statutory and regulatory provisions governing
the generic drug approval process and labeling requirements reveals why
arguments supporting preemption must fail. The FDCA sets forth the basic
68 Presidential Documents: Memorandum of May 20, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May
22, 2009).
69 Id. at 24,693-94 ("To ensure that executive departments and agencies include state-
ments of preemption in regulations only when such statements have a sufficient legal basis:
i. Heads of departments and agencies should not include in regulatory preambles statements
that the department or agency intends to preempt State law through the regulation except
where preemption provisions are also included in the codified regulation. 2. Heads of depart-
ments and agencies should not include preemption provisions in codified regulations except
where such provisions would be justified under legal principles governing preemption, in-
cluding the principles outlined in [Clinton] Executive Order 13132. 3. Heads of departments
and agencies should review regulations issued within the past 1o years that contain state-
ments in regulatory preambles or codified provisions intended by the department or agency
to preempt State law, in order to decide whether such statements or provisions are justified
under applicable legal principles governing preemption. Where the head of a department or
agency determines that a regulatory statement of preemption or codified regulatory provision
cannot be so justified, the head of that department or agency should initiate appropriate ac-
tion, which may include amendment of the relevant regulation.").
For a discussion of the debate regarding preemption provisions in preambles, see
Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability
Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 437,444 (2009) (discussing the deference given to preambles, find-
ing that "[w]hile briefs and preambles arguably lack 'the force of law' necessary to warrant
Chevron mandatory deference, the doctrine on deference to agency preambles and amicus
briefs-particularly in the realm of preemption-is far from clear"). See also Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAuL
L. REV. 227, 227-29 (2007).
70 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (noting that "Congress has repeatedly
declined to pre-empt state law, and the FDA's recently adopted position that state tort suits
interfere with its statutory mandate is entitled to no weight").
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requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 352 that all drugs and devices have adequate
warning labels. This provision describes the labeling requirements that
prevent a drug from being misbranded. Section 352(f) states that a drug is
misbranded unless it includes
(1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against
use in those pathological conditions or by children where its use may be
dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of
administration or application, in such manner and form, as are necessary for
the protection of users .... "
Section 352 makes no distinction between generics and brand-name drugs.
It applies to both types of drugs. As a result, both generics and brand
names have a statutory obligation to maintain adequate warning labels or
risk being deemed misbranded and subject to removal from the market.7"
FDA regulations further affirm the need to maintain adequate warning
labels. The specific requirements on the content and the format of drug
labeling are provided in 21 C.ER. § 201.57. The warning must "describe
clinically significant adverse reactions" and "the labeling must be revised
to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as there is
reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal relationship
need not have been definitely established.
'73
Again, the FDA makes no distinction in § 201.57 with respect to
prescription generic drugs and brand-name drugs. Moreover, the language
that a "causal relationship need not have been definitely established"
makes clear that the FDA places importance on ensuring labels are updated
to reflect new hazards as soon as "reasonable evidence" becomes known.
74
B. The Statutory and Regulatory Requirements of the Approval Process for
Generic and Brand-Name Drugs
As previously explained, 71 the manufacturer of a generic drug submitting
an application under the ANDA approval process must show that the label
on the generic drug is the same as that on the reference-listed drug.
7 6
71 21 U.S.C. § 352(0 (2oo6).
72 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). See also Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (W.D. Ky.
2009) (stating that "[flederal regulation simply provides that if a drug manufacturer's label is
unsubstantiated, then the FDA can remove the drug from the market").
73 21 C.ER. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2009). For over-the-counter drugs, see 21 C.F.R. § 201.8o
(zoo9).
74 21 C.FR. § 201.57(c)(6)(i).
75 See supra notes 39-42.
76 See zI U.S.C. § 3 5 5 (J)(z)(A)(v) (requiring "information to show that the labeling pro-
posed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug").
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While the FDA may withdraw its ANDA approval should the labeling no
longer conform with that of the reference-listed drug," there appear to
be no instances in which the FDA has done so as a result of a generic
manufacturer strengthening or adding a warning.78
In addition, the CBE regulations found in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 provide
a means by which drug manufacturers can make post-approval labeling
changes, subject to FDA notice and approval. The question then becomes:
can generic manufacturers take advantage of this provision to propose their
own changes? The actual language of the regulation indicates the answer
to this question is yes.
Manufacturers who submit abbreviated applications, referring to
generic manufacturers who follow the ANDA process, are addressed in
21 C.F.R. § 314.97.19 Section 314.97 requires generic manufacturers to
comply with 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 and § 314.71.80 Turning to § 314.70(c), this
section allows a manufacturer to supplement and make other changes to
an approved application." At no point does this section exclude or limit
its application to only brand-name or only generic drugs. Therefore, any
argument that generic manufacturers cannot take advantage of the CBE
process as defined in § 314.70 to enhance their warning labels is plainly
refuted by the actual language of the regulations.8"
During such time when the generic manufacturer implements an
enhanced or new warning and the brand-name manufacturer awaits FDA
approval, the labels on the generic drug and on the reference-listed drug
will inevitably be different. While 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) requires that
the labels of generics and the reference-listed drugs be identical in the
approval process, 3 this later lapse in conformity has been acknowledged
by the FDA.' Although referring to labeling changes proposed by brand-
name manufacturers instead of generic manufacturers, the FDA noted
in its guidance to the drug industry that "[blecause the regulations state
that the labeling of the generic must be the same as the innovator [brand-
name drug], the revision should be made at the very earliest time possible."85
77 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.15 o(b)(Io) (2oo9).
78 See Stacel v. Teva Pharms., USA, 62o F. Supp. zd 899, 905 (N.D. I11. 2oo9).
79 21 C.F.R. § 314.97.
80 Id.
81 21 C.ER. § 314.70(c).
8z See, e.g., Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 E. Supp. 2d 642, 655 (E.D. La. 2008), aff'd,
Demahy v. Actavis, No. o8-312o4, 20 o WL 46513 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2010).
83 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(2)(A)(v) (2oo6).
84 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REVISING
ANDA LABELING FOLLOWING REVISION OF THE RLD LABELING 4-5 (2OOO), available at http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/
ucm07289I.pdf.
85 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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The FDA knew there would be some lapse in conformity while updating
the labels. Again, the FDA was referencing changes proposed by brand
names. Nevertheless, it is worth recognizing that the FDA knew there
would be times when the labels were not the same. To make the argument
that the labels must always be identical runs counter to the FDA's own
acknowledgment that sometimes, under the regulations, that will not be
the case.
C. Conflict Preemption and Generic Drugs
As previously noted, under principles of conflict preemption, "state law
is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law."86 In light of the
requirement that generic drug manufacturers conform the labels on their
products to the labels on the approved brand-name drugs at the time they
submit an application for FDA approval,87 the argument may be made that
the defense of implied conflict preemption in particular, based on state-
law claims for failure to warn, is strengthened for generic manufacturers.
As the following cases will show, however, such arguments may be refuted
by looking to the language of the applicable statutes, regulations, and case
law.
1. The Timing of the Labeling Change.-Proponents of preemption
insist that federal law mandates generic drug manufacturers use the
same label as the brand-name manufacturer at all times.88 As already
discussed, labeling differences at certain times will be inevitable.8 9
Moreover, courts addressing this question have focused their
attention on updating labels as soon as information is available
as opposed to insisting on the need to maintain identical labels. 90
This issue was raised in the case Kelloggv. Wyeth.9 1 In the years from 2000
to 2004, Ethel Kellogg took the generic drug metoclopramide, the generic
form of the brand-name drug Reglan, for the treatment of gastroesophageal
reflux disease.92 As a result of her prolonged use of this drug, Kellogg
eventually developed a condition known as tardive dyskinesia syndrome. 93
Her symptoms included oral dystonic facial grimacing, lip twisting, tongue
thrusting, difficulty swallowing, and difficulty controlling her hands and
86 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)).
87 21 U.S.C § 355(J)(2)(A)(v).
88 See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 421, 424 (D. Vt. 2oo8).
89 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
90 Kellogg, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
91 Id. at 424.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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arms. 94 Unfortunately for Kellogg, it was not until July 2004, after she had
ceased taking the generic drug metoclopramide, that the FDA approved
a labeling change to the brand-name drug label. 9s The new label warned
that therapy should not exceed twelve weeks. 96 Meanwhile, Kellogg had
been taking the generic form of the drug for four years.97 She sued, alleging
that the drug's generic and brand-name manufacturers were both liable
for failing to warn her about the dangers of overexposure to the drug.98
The generic manufacturer countered by arguing that "because federal
law require[d] them to label their product with exactly the same label as
the one approved by the [FDA] for the name brand manufacturer, federal
law preempt[ed] any state court tort claim based on failure-to-warn." 99
The United States District Court for the District of Vermont was not
persuaded by this argument and held that FDA approval of a generic drug
label does not preempt state failure-to-warn claims.100 The court stated
that "[tihe obligation to revise a label to include a warning as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a
drug applies to both generic and listed drug manufacturers."'' 1 The court
refused to accept the argument made by the generic manufacturer that
it was "prohibited from strengthening [its] drug labels without prior
agency approval."' 102 Rather, the generic manufacturer had an obligation
to update the label as soon as information of a potential hazard surfaced.
Indeed, the regulations governing these procedures "make[] clear that a
generic manufacturer must take steps to warn its customers when it learns
it may be marketing an unsafe drug."0 3 Simply maintaining a label that
matches the brand-name label is not sufficient for compliance. 104 According
to the court in Mensingv. Wyeth, "[21 C.ER.I § 201.57(e) does not permit
generic manufacturers passively to accept the inadequacy of their drug's
94 Id.
95 Id. at 427. In 2009, pursuant to the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. iio-85, § 901, 121 Stat. 823,922 (2007), the Food and Drug Administration
ordered manufacturers of metoclopramide to add a "Boxed Warning" to their labels, warning
of the potential for developing tardive dyskinesia in patients who take the drug for at least
three months.
96 Kellogg, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
97 Id. at 424.
98 Id. at 423-24.
99 Id. at 424.
'oo Id. at 436.
iow Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
oz Court Rules That Generic Drug Manufacturer Cannot Use "Preemption" to Avoid
Liability, http://honolulu.injuryboard.com/fda-and-presciprtion-drugs/court-rules-that-ge-
neric-drug-manufacturer-cannotb-usepreemption-to-avoid-liability.aspx?googleid=255252
(Jan. 15, 2009, 03:53 EST).
103 Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 E3d 6o3,6o8 (8th Cir. 2009).
104 Id. at 609.
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label as they market and profit from it."'' 10 So while it is correct to say the
generic label must be the same as the brand-name label at the time of
approval, it does not follow that the two must always remain identical for
the sake of being the same.
In Laisure-Radkev. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.,1°6 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington held that the plaintiff's state
products liability claims, which were based on a generic manufacturer's
duty to provide adequate warnings on its labels, were not preempted by
federal law.107 The defendants argued that "under federal regulations, a
generic pharmaceutical manufacturer has no ability to alter the labeling
of its drug product and is prohibited from providing warnings different
from or in addition to those contained on the label of the reference listed
drug."'1 8 The Laisure-Radke court rejected this contention.1°9 It based its
reasoning in part on the fact that while generic manufacturers must submit
the same label as the brand-name counterparts when seeking approval
under the ANDA process, the generic manufacturer, nevertheless, has
"the same power and duty to add or strengthen [its] warnings, as do the
manufacturers of pioneer drugs, and therefore, the same liability."" 0 The
regulations governing the process for requesting changes to approved labels
do not distinguish between NDAs and ANDAs."' Thus, drugs approved
through the original process and those approved through the expedited
ANDA process may be held to the same standards in terms of subsequent
changes to their labels based on new information.
The court in Laisure-Radke looked to the Fourth Circuit case Foster v.
American HomeProducts Corp. "I for guidance regarding federal preemption." 3
Foster specifically dealt with the question of whether a brand-name
manufacturer may be held liable for negligent misrepresentation based
on an injury actually caused by a generic drug. The Foster plaintiffs sued
Wyeth following the death of their daughter after she took the generic
form of one of the brand-name drugs Wyeth manufactured" 4 While
the court held that, under Maryland law, no cause of action for negligent
105 Id.
io6 Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., No. Co3-3654RSM, zoo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78804
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2oo6).
107 Id. at 18.
io8 Id. at *z.
IO9 Id. at *io.
1io Id.
iii See 21 C.ER. §§ 314.70, 314.71 (2oo9). The court in Laisure-Radke noted that the
statutes on which it relied had been updated but the updates were not effective at the time
the case was heard. Laisure-Radke, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78804, at * 12 n. i.
112 Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 E3d I65 (4th Cir. 1994).
13 Laisure-Radke, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78804, at 10-Ii.
114 Foster, 29 E3d at 166.
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misrepresentation existed against one manufacturer for injuries caused
by another,"' it also found that "manufacturers of generic drugs approved
pursuant to [ANDAs] may alter a drug's labeling '[t]o add or strengthen
a contraindication, warning, precaution or adverse reaction' or '[t]o
delete false, misleading or unsupported indications for use or claims for
effectiveness' without prior FDA approval." 1 6 The court went on to note
that "[w]hen a generic manufacturer adopts a name brand manufacturer's
warnings and representations without independent investigation, it does so
at the risk that such warnings and representations may be flawed."" 7 Again,
the specific question before the court involved brand-name manufacturers.
Nevertheless, subsequent rulings by courts across the country found this
reasoning persuasive.'
2. CBE Provisions and Generic Drugs.--Generic manufacturers also
maintain that the Changes Being Effected (CBE) process in 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70 does not apply to them; therefore, they are prevented from
adding or strengthening the warning labels on their products without
prior FDA approval." 9 This argument was rejected by the Kellogg v.
Wyeth court upon reconsideration following the Supreme Court's decision
in Wyeth v. Levine.12 Relying on Levine, the United States District Court
for the District of Vermont noted that the Supreme Court's holding
was not so narrowly drawn as to say the CBE provision applied only to
115 Id. at 172.
iI6 Id. at 169 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(a), 3 4.97 (1993)) (emphasis added).
17 Id.
118 See, e.g., Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:o4-CV-1477, 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49616,
at 12-14 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2oo6).
I19 See 21 C.ER. § 314.70 (2009); see also Kelly v. Wyeth, No. 2003-3314F, 2007 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 136, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2007). In May of 2ooo, Kelly was treated
for gastrointestinal problems and was prescribed a brand-name drug for which the pharmacist
dispensed the generic version metoclopramide. Id. at * 1-2. Kelly subsequently developed a
movement disorder known as akathisia as a result of taking the generic drug. Id. at *. The
generic manufacturer, Teva, argued for summary judgment based on federal conflict preemp-
tion. Id. at *i. Teva maintained that it was impossible to comply with both FDA regulations
and Massachusetts state tort law. Id. at *8-9. The court looked to the Foster v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 29 E3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994), decision, as well as Laisure-Radke, No.Co3-3654RSM,
2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 788o4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2oo6), in deciding that even if Teva was
not in a position to unilaterally change its label through the moderate changes procedure, it
nevertheless had a duty to apply for a labeling change through the CBE procedures in 21
C.ER. § 314.70(c). Id. at *13-15. The Kelly court distinguished this case from that of Dowhal
v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, in which the defendant drug manufacturer first
petitioned the FDA for permission to change the label and was later denied. Id. at *16; see
Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d I, 5 (Cal. 20o4). By contrast,
in the Kelly case, Teva had made no proposals to the FDA for a labeling change to reflect the
newly discovered dangers. Kelly, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 136, at *16.
12o Kellogg v. Wyeth, 61 2 E Supp. 2d 437,439 (D. Vt. 2009).
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brand-name drug manufacturers.' The district court then undertook
an analysis of Levine and the implications of its holding.' It noted
that the Supreme Court relied on two guiding principles in reaching its
decision.2 3 The two principles on which the Court relied are as follows:
one, that "'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
preemption case,"' and, two, that "'in all pre-emption cases, and particularly
in those in which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,' we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." ' 4
The Supreme Court "noted that as recently as 2007, when Congress
granted the FDA the statutory authority to require a manufacturer to
change its drug label," it declined to include a provision mandating FDA
preapproval of all drug labeling changes, and the FDCA continues to place
responsibility for updating a label on the manufacturers.'
Finally, based on the above analysis, the Supreme Court held that the
CBE provision allows a manufacturer to strengthen a warning without prior
FDA approval." 6 The Kelloggcourt expressly noted that the Supreme Court
decision did not include a caveat exempting generic manufacturers from
responsibility for updating labels. 7 The Kellogg court went on to deny
the defendant's motion for an immediate appeal of the court's previous
decision.' Thus, in the view of the Kellogg court, the CBE provision could
have been used by generic and brand-name manufacturers alike. Of
course, Levine did not directly involve generic drugs, so the issue has not
been settled definitively.
Other courts have also taken on the issue of whether or not the CBE
provision applies to generics and held in the affirmative. As the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Demahy v. Actavis, "[Tihe CBE regulation
... does not, on its face, distinguish between generic and name brand drug
manufacturers; that is, it does not forbid a generic manufacturer from using
the CBE process to unilaterally change a label."2 9 The court next examined
the defendant Actavis's argument that, despite the plain language of
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Id. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 187, i194 (2009)).
124 Id. (citing Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95) (ellipses omitted).
125 Id. at 44o.
126 Id.
127 Id. at44i.
128 Id. at 442.
129 Demahy v. Actavis, No. 08-31204,2010 WL 46513, at *7 (5th Cir. Jan. 8,201 o) (looking
to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2009)).
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§ 314.70, the CBE provision was not available to generic manufacturers
based on FDA commentary which said that "the labeling for an ANDA
product must, with few exceptions, correspond to that for the reference
listed drug." 3' However, a closer reading of the commentary, in the court's
opinion, revealed that the commentary pertained only to the pre-approval
label, not the post-approval label. 13 1 Furthermore, 21 C.ER. § 314.97,
entitled "Supplements and other changes to an approved abbreviated
application," instructed ANDA applicants to comply with § 314.70, which
is the CBE provision. 3 Ultimately, as the court acknowledged, "[hiad the
FDA intended to deny generic manufacturers access to CBE procedures,
notwithstanding § 314.97's plain language, we [the court] might expect the
FDA to say so, either in § 314.97 or the CBE provision itself."'
133
At least one court has held that reaching the question of the availability
of the CBE provision to generic manufacturers was not necessary to a
finding that state common-law tort law claims were not preempted by
federal law. In Mensingv. Wyeth, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found
it did not even need to reach the issue of CBE applicability. M It held
that the generic manufacturer defendants "could have at least proposed
a label change that the FDA could receive and impose uniformly on all
metoclopramide manufacturers if approved."'35 The court went on to say,
"If they realized their label was insufficient but did not believe they could
even propose a label change, they could have simply stopped selling the
product." 136
3. The Role of FDA ApprovaL-The court's decision in Kellogg v. Wyeth
also provides an illustration of why preemption should not be available to
generic drug manufacturers as a defense against failure-to-warn claims.
37
Once again, the generic company argued that its label must always be the
same as the brand-name manufacturer's and "a state common law damages
action could result in requiring a warning that was not approved by the
FDA." 1 38 This action, they argued, could in turn subject the manufacturer
to penalties under the FDCA or the withdrawal of FDA approval.'39
First, the court noted that a judgment for damages does not require
130 Id. at *7 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 17950-01(1992)).
i31 Id.
132 Id. at *8.
133 Id.
134 Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F3d 603, 6o8 (8th Cir. 2009).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 6i 1.
137 Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F, Supp. 2d 421 (D. Vt. 2oo8).
138 Id. at 430.
139 Id.
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a drug manufacturer to alter anything on its label.' 4 The FDA would
have to initiate an action in federal court to address a misbranding
violation. The court was quick to note that no evidence existed to
show that the FDA had ever proposed the withdrawal of approval for
a generic drug because its manufacturer sought to strengthen a label
warning.' The court went on to state that at any time in the process
a generic manufacturer having new information about the hazards of a
drug could have availed itself of the CBE process, could have sought FDA
approval for a change in the drug labeling, could have provided health care
professionals with stronger warnings, or could have elected not to act and
to accept the risk of tort liability should an injured plaintiff prevail on her
suit. It was thus not physically impossible to comply with state and federal
law.
42
In terms of obstacle preemption, the Kellogg court was also unable to find
preemption on these grounds. First, looking to the history of the FDCA,
the court could find "[n]othing in the statute indicat[ing] that tort actions
would henceforth stand as an obstacle to these Congressional objectives"
of providing lower cost generic drugs."
The defendants instead argued that jury verdicts would, in fact, be "an
obstacle to the FDA's regulations."' 144 In support of their position pertaining
to preemption, the defendants cited to a 2006 final rule amending drug
labeling regulations, in which the FDA maintained that its regulations with
respect to the ANDA and NDA labeling requirements "actually impose a
federal ceiling as well as a floor, and that it 'believes that ... FDA approval
of labeling under the [FDCA] ... preempts conflicting or contrary State
law."" 4  Observing that although the FDA has the authority to engage in
rulemaking regarding drug safety, the court did not find that "the agency's
opinion on preemption of State law [was] 'promulgated in the exercise of
that authority."' ' 46 Instead, the statement was made in the preamble where
140 Id. (citing Souther v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), 489 F. Supp.
2d 230, 276-77 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
141 Id. (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)) (noting that "[a]
hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant preemption"); see also Witczak v.
Pfizer, Inc., 377 E Supp. 2d 726, 731 (D. Minn. 2005) (declining to find an irreconcilable con-
flict based on "assumptions of what the FDA would have done if defendant had unilaterally
strengthened its warning label").
142 Kellogg, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
143 Id. at 432.
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, & 6Ol)).
146 Id. at 433.
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it was not subject to the notice and comment process, 147 thereby entitling it
only to Skidmore deference and thus without the authority to preempt.'
48
In further support of this argument against preemption, the court in
Mensing v. Wyeth refused the defendant Wyeth's argument that compliance
with state and federal law would "obstruct the purposes and objectives
of federal law."149 The generic defendants maintained that proposing
a labeling change would result in expensive clinical studies, thereby
obstructing the primary purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
which was to provide low-cost generic drugs more quickly.150 The court was
not persuaded. Generic manufacturers already have a duty to collect and
report adverse drug reactions.'"' Moreover, state tort law claims such as the
plaintiff's "lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the
FDA, bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times."'52
It should also be noted that a finding of preemption would leave
plaintiffs with no avenue in which to seek redress. A finding of preemption
of "state failure-to-warn claims would foreclose a remedy that was
traditionally available and for which federal law provides no substitute."'5 3
To completely take away such state remedies is to leave plaintiffs without
a cause of action.
4. Field Preemption and Genetic Drugs.-Generic manufacturers have also
attempted to rely on principles of field preemption, arguing that only the
FDA may determine whether a generic drug label should be revised and
arguing against a role for state tort litigation.' 4 However, the court in Kellogg
v. Wyeth directly countered this contention in saying "the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA were enacted in 1984, against the backdrop
of decades of federal drug labeling regulation coexisting with state tort
litigation."' 5 Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc. expressed this same sentiment, noting
the "longstanding coexistence of state and federal law in the regulatory
history and background" in federal drug labeling regulations.
1' 6
147 Id. (citing 2 1 C.F.R § io.85(d)(i) ("a statement of policy or interpretation other than
the text of a proposed or final regulation constitutes an advisory opinion").
148 Id.; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 14o (1944) (considering the deference
to be given an agency administrator's decision by looking to the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade").
149 Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603,608 (8th Cir. 2009).
I5O Id. at 61i.
151 Id. at 612.
152 Id. (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009)).
153 Demahy v. Actavis, No. o8-31204, 2010 WL 46513, at *4 (zoo).
154 Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. zd 437 438-40 (D. Vt. 2009).
155 Id. at 441.
156 Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 60i F. Supp. zd 1262, 1265 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
2009-201o]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Congress is adept at including preemption provisions when it so chooses,
and it clearly chose not to do so in the case of state common-law failure-to-
warn claims involving generic drug manufacturers. Moreover, as previously
explained, Congress included a preemption provision for medical devices
in the FDCA.1s7 It did not, however, include a preemption provision for
either brand-name or generic drugs.5 8 It thus seems clear that Congress
expected federal and state law to coexist in this field.
5. Conclusion.-Ultimately, generic drug manufacturers may use CBE
procedures to update their labels following ANDA approval and, therefore,
they should be held liable for failure to warn under state tort law when
they fail to update their warning labels to reflect new information. The
FDCA includes no express preemption provisions, and support for implied
preemption is lacking. Allowing generic drug manufacturers to argue that
state tort claims are barred by federal preemption principles ignores the
fact that the existing statutes and regulations provide mechanisms by
which generic manufacturers may unilaterally update their labels. Thus,
the defense of "federal preemption" should not be available to generic
manufacturers.
IV. THE CASE FOR PREEMPTION
Despite the number of courts declining to find that state tort law claims
against generic manufacturers are preempted," 9 those manufacturers are
not without case law supporting their position in favor of preemption."
157 21 U.S.C. § 36ok(a) (2oo6).
158 Stacel v. Teva Pharms., USA, 620 E Supp. 2d 899, 9o4 (N.D. I11. 2009).
159 See supra Part III.C.
16o See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F Supp. 2d 514, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2oo6). Coladcco
dealt with yet another products liability suit against both the brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers based on the labeling deficiencies of a generic drug that allegedly contributed
to the plaintiff's wife's suicide. Id. at 518. Similar to the ruling in Fosterv. American Home
Products Corp., 29 E3d 165, i66 (4th Cir. 1994), the district court in Colacicco dismissed the
complaint against the brand-name manufacturer, finding that the manufacturer did not owe
the plaintiff a duty of care when the plaintiff was actually injured by a drug produced by
a generic company. Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39. The court then ruled that claims
against the generic manufacturer were preempted, and the company could not be held liable
as a result of FDA regulations which precluded them from strengthening their labels. Id.
at 537-38. Finally, the court ruled that preemption was appropriate because the FDA had
considered and rejected the particular warning the plaintiff claimed should have been given.
Id. at 538.
While the FDA under the previous administration submitted an amicus brief in this case
affirming its view that the plaintiff's claims were preempted as a result of the FDA's rejection
of the proposed warning at issue, the current administration has since withdrawn its support
for the preemption position in light of the Supreme Court decision in Wyeth v. Levine. See
supra notes 59, 66-67 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Colacicco decision has since been
reversed and remanded based on Levine. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
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Even in light of the Wyeth v. Levine decision, at least one federal district
court was willing to still find that state tort law claims against a generic
manufacturer for inadequate labeling were preempted based on
impossibility conflict preemption.1 6 1 In Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharmaceuticals Co.,
the defendant Perrigo was initially granted summary judgment in a case
involving a child who sustained liver damage as a result of taking generic
over-the-counter ibuprofen. 161 Following the Supreme Court's decision in
Levine, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. 163 Nevertheless, the
district court declined to change its position, placing strong emphasis on
the fact that "[u]nlike in Levine... the drug at issue here is a generic rather
than a brand-name product." 164 The court did not read the Levine decision
as affecting its holding in Gaeta.
.One of the primary differences in courts finding preemption of state
tort law claims against generic manufacturers and those declining to find
preemption is the availability of the CBE provision. The Gaeta court held
that the CBE provision was not available to generic manufacturers and,
therefore, a generic manufacturer could not change its label without prior
FDA approval. 165 It did, however, acknowledge the split of opinion among
district courts on this very issue. 166
In Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., decided prior to Wyeth v. Levine, the court held
that the brand-name manufacturer Wyeth had a common-law duty to use
due care in formulating its warning and that its duty extended to patients
and doctors who foreseeably relied on that information, whether it be a
16t See Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., No. C 05-04115 JW., 2009 WL 4250690 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 24, 2009).
16z Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 562 F Supp. 2d IO9i (N.D. Cal. 2oo8).
163 Gaeta, 2009 WL 425069o, at *1.
164 Id. at *3.
165 Id. The court based its decision in part on 21 C.F.R. § 314.93, which reads:
A person who wants to submit an abbreviated new drug application
for a drug product which is not identical to a listed drug in route of
administration, dosage form, and strength, or in which one active
ingredient is substituted for one of the active ingredients in a listed
combination drug, must first obtain permission from FDA to submit
such an abbreviated application.
21 C.ER. § 314.93(b) (20o9). It then looked to 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2849 n.i, which states:
"CBE changes are not available for generic drugs approved under an abbreviated new drug
application under 21 U.S.C. 355(J). To the contrary, a generic drug manufacturer is required to
conform to the approved labeling for the listed drug." 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2849 n. I (2oo8).
166 Gaeta, 2009 WL 425069 o , at *4- The Gaeta court also reconsidered the issue of field
preemption and the scope of FDA's authority in drug labeling. Id. at *5- The court agreed that
the Levine case addressed questions concerning the deference to be given to the Preamble and
did not use this theory of preemption as a basis for its decision in reconsidering its decision to
grant summary judgment to Perrigo. Id.
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brand-name drug or its generic equivalent. 167 As a further demonstration
of the differences among courts over liability for generic and brand-name
manufacturers, the court declined to follow the reasoning of the Foster
court' 68 and instead held that a brand-name manufacturer could in fact
be held liable for inadequate product warnings despite the fact that the
plaintiff took a generic form of the drug.169 The court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the generic manufacturers without discussing issues
of preemption. 7 ' The plaintiff could not prove that her doctor read and
relied on the warnings for the generic drug, thereby failing to establish
proximate cause.'7 ' This case only confirms the need for the issue to be
definitively resolved by either Congress or the Supreme Court.
In Morris v. Wyeth, also decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Wyeth v. Levine, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky denied a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the court's
dismissal of his strict liability and negligence failure-to-warn claims against
the generic manufacturers of the drug metoclopramide.7 2 The plaintiff
maintained that he was injured as a result of the generic manufacturers'
failure to warn of the long-term effects of taking the drug.'73 The district
court initially dismissed his claims based on federal preemption.' In its
reconsideration of his claims, the court first turned to questions involving
conflict preemption, rejecting the reasoning of the court in McKenney v.
Purepac Pharmaceutical Co., 7 ' which held that an actual conflict arises only
where the generic manufacturer sought a heightened warning that the
FDA expressly precluded.'76
In McKenney, the court concluded that "the FDA's ability to withdraw
both brand and generic drugs bearing labels with unsubstantiated claims
from the market [is] evidence that regulation of brand and generic drug
labeling is indistinguishable for preemption purposes."'7 But the Morris
court disagreed. The ability of the FDA to withdraw both types of drugs
from the market did not, in its opinion, mean they could both unilaterally
change their labels.'78 The two were separate considerations. The court
167 Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 304-05 (Cal. Ct. App. zoo8).
I68 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
169 Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304-05.
170 Id. at 320.
171 Id. at318-i9.
172 Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 E Supp. zd 677, 679 (W.D. Ky. 2oo9).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 68o.
175 Id. at 68 1-83 (citing McKenney v. Purepac Pharm. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81o (Cal. Ct.
App. 2oo8)).
176 McKenney, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 820.
177 Morris, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 68z (citing McKenney, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 818).
178 Id.
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ultimately declined to follow the McKenney finding that the federal
regulation of brand-name and generic drugs is indistinguishable for federal
preemption purposes. 7 9 It considered the two to be different, and while
brand names had the ability to change their labels unilaterally, generics
could not.
The court considered the questions concerning when a manufacturer
"should" as opposed to "must" notify the FDA about a change in safety
information for an approved drug application. 8 0 The applicable regulations
for the ANDA approval process, which apply to generic drug manufacturers,
state that an ANDA holder "should" notify the FDA when new safety
information comes to light that should be added to a label.' However,
an NDA holder which has gone through the process that applies to brand-
name drugs "must" notify the FDA about a change in safety information.'
Thus, the requirements imposed on generic versus brand-name drugs are
different. The court then stated that whether or not an NDA holder is able
to unilaterally change its label is an open question to be resolved by the
Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine, which was pending at the time. 13
The Supreme Court later answered this question in the affirmative.
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court stated that "[tihe CBE regulation permitted
Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its warning, and the mere fact that the
FDA approved Phenergan's label does not establish that it would have
prohibited such a change."' 4 While this holding does not definitively
settle the question for generic manufacturers, it does not close the door on
state failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers as a ruling to the
contrary would have done. Had the Court held brand-name manufacturers
could not unilaterally change their labels without prior FDA approval, it
would be arguably more difficult to claim generic manufacturers could do
so.
The fact remains that Congress has not spoken directly to the preemption
issue, nor has the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the specific
question pertaining to generics. That being said, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has 'legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,' we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
179 Id. at 683.
18o Id. at 682.
18I Id. (citing Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950,
17961 (Apr. z8, i992) (to be codified at 21 C.ER. pts. 2,5, 1O, 310, 314, 320, & 433)).
182 Id. (citing Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R. §
3 14.7o(a) (2009)).
183 Id.
184 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187,1199 (zoo9) (emphasis added).
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the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'"" 5 In addition, as noted by the
court in Kelloggv. Wyeth, "It is precisely where Congress has not included an
express statement concerning the preemptive effect of its enactment that
courts must be mindful that they do not lightly tread on the historic powers
of states to protect the health and welfare of their citizens, and apply the
presumption."'186 This presumption against preemption has particular force
in implied preemption cases where congressional intent is not clear.
Questions involving the presumption against preemption were also
raised in Wyeth v. Levine,187 in which Wyeth argued the presumption should
not apply "because the Federal Government has regulated drug labeling
for more than a century."'" The Court disagreed with Wyeth's reasoning,
instead noting that the presumption was meant to respect "States as
'independent sovereigns in our federal system,"' which in turn led the
Court to note that "Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law
causes of action."'89 In his dissent, Justice Alito questioned the application
of the presumption against preemption to conflict preemption cases in
general. 190 The majority, however, disagreed with this assertion, instead
citing a number of cases to the contrary in which the presumption had been
upheld.' 9'
While Levine dealt with the presumption in the context of brand-name
drugs, Barnhill v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., addressed this issue with
regard to generic drugs. 19 The district court acknowledged the traditional
domain of public health and safety issues as within the states' powers and
presumed that "Congress did not intend to supersede the states' powers to
regulate."' 19 3 A generic manufacturer would have to show a conflict between
state tort law on health and safety matters and federal labeling requirements
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the two can coexist."9 The
defendant in Barnhill was unable to establish this conflict. 9 The fact
remains that it is possible to comply with federal labeling requirements
185 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
186 Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 421, 429 n.5 (D. Vt. zoo8).
187 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3.
188 Id.
189 Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc., 58 U.S. at 485).
19o Id. at 1228-29 (Alito, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 1195 n.3 (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989);
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,716 (1985); Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,387 (2002)).
192 Barnhill v.Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. o6-oz8z-CB-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44718
(S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007).
193 Id. at *6 (citing Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715).
194 Id. at "7.
195 Id. at *lo-1-4.
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and state warning laws."9
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Two critical points must be kept in mind: the number of generic drugs
on the market being prescribed is only continuing to rise, 197 and doctors and
pharmacists need to be aware of any dangers associated with the use of such
drugs. Relying on the brand-name drug manufacturer alone to maintain an
adequate warning label when that label could in fact be deficient is risky at
best and outright dangerous at worst. As the market share for generic drugs
increases and the share for brand-name drugs decreases, 19' the incentive
for brand-names to maintain adequate labels may be lessened.
The Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., case also draws attention to the policy
considerations underlying the issue of generic drugs and preemption.
Morris argued that "the economic burden placed on generic manufacturers
to comply with heightened state failure-to-warn liability does not
outweigh the life-saving benefit of clearly informing consumers about
the risks associated with taking metoclopramide." 199 Morris noted that
(1) generic manufacturers dominate the market for metoclopramide sales,
and (2) the defendants "were aware of the safety concerns associated with
[the drug]."0 The defendants, in turn, looked to the initial passage of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which were passed with the purpose of
making lower-cost generic drugs available to the public "at the risk that not
all drugs would be safe for every consumer." z ' The court acknowledged
these competing interests, yet ultimately sided with the defendants. 02
While passage of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments was undoubtedly
meant to lower the cost of drugs available to consumers, 0 3 to say that
Congress did not equally value the health and safety of the consumers who
would ultimately be benefited or harmed by taking the drugs stretches all
reasoning. What purpose does an inexpensive drug serve if its side effects
lead to dangerous and severe consequences of which the prescribing doctor
is unaware?
Equally noteworthy in terms of public policy were the attorneys
general of forty-seven states who joined an amicus brief opposing federal
conflict preemption for brand-name manufacturers in the Supreme Court
196 Id. at *ii.
197 See Facts at a Glance, supra note 27.
198 See id.
i99 Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 677,688 (W.D. Ky. 2009).
2oo Id.
zoI Id.
202 Id. at 689.
203 See supra note 33.
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case, Wyeth v. Levine.2°4 The court in Morris noted that while the attorneys
general argued that state tort liability does not conflict with federal labeling
regulations or interfere with the FDCA, it did not find the brief persuasive. 05
Nor was it persuaded by the views of the congressman who originally co-
sponsored the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and opposed preemption-
U.S. Representative Henry A. Waxman."° In an amicus brief submitted on
behalf of the respondent Levine, eighteen members of Congress joined in
opposing preemption of state-law claims, stating that
[ailtering the construction of the FDCA at this late date would also frustrate
congressional intent and impair the statutory system of federal prescription
drug regulation. Far from standing "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," state-law
claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers "necessarily perform an
important remedial role in compensating" injured individuals and in
encouraging drug safety.207
If the amicus brief may stand as an indication of congressional intent, it is
quite clear that Congress did not intend to bar state-law claims and saw the
importance in allowing such claims.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has yet to definitely rule on
this issue, it is clear that states and public officials are paying attention to
it. Public officials certainly have an interest in ensuring the availability of
low-cost drugs. Nevertheless, they also bear a duty to ensure the drugs on
the market contain adequate precautions designed to warn consumers of
the adverse effects associated with taking such drugs.
CONCLUSION
As the number of generic drugs on the market continues to rise, 08
issues involving generics and preemption will only continue to confront
courts. In Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., the court even acknowledged that the cases
cited by the plaintiff were "evidence [of] an emerging split of authority
among lower courts over whether FDA regulation of generic drug
204 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2oo9).
205 Moris, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
2o6 Id. at 687. The Morris court noted that the brief submitted by Rep. Waxman was
submitted in his individual capacity and not on behalf of Congress. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Members of Congress in Support of Respondent at i, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2oo8)
(No. 06- 1249), 2oo8 WL 38516o9.
207 Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Respondent, supra note
2o6, at 4-5 (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002)).
208 See Facts at a Glance, supra note 27.
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labeling preempts state failure-to-warn claims."2 9 That being said, the
decision handed down in Wyeth v. Levine goes a long way toward answering
preemption questions about prescription drugs in general. The Kellogg
court noted, in reference to preemption and generic drugs, that "the recent
Levine decision reduces substantially the grounds for difference of opinion
concerning whether federal law preempts state law failure-to-warn cases
against drug manufacturers." 10
Ultimately, when a drug injures a person as a result of an inadequate
warning label, the manufacturer of that drug should be held liable. FDA
procedures exist for generic manufacturers to alter or update a warning
label. The protection of consumers necessitates that doctors receive the
information they need to prescribe safely a drug. This requirement, in
turn, means that warning labels must be as accurate as possible and
warnings must be updatsed as soon as new information becomes known.
Even if the brand-name manufacturer updates its warning without undue
delay, it may take some time before the change is actually indicated on
the generic label."' Permitting generic drug manufacturers to hide behind
brand-name manufacturers and the cloak of federal preemption will only
lead to further delays and complications in getting safety information to
the doctors who rely on the warnings when prescribing drugs. Generic
manufacturers therefore should not be permitted to use the defense of
federal preemption in defeating state failure-to-warn claims by patients
injured as a result of taking those drugs.
2o9 Morris, 642 F Supp. 2d at 681.
21o Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437,439 (D. Vt. 2009).
211 Julie Schmit, Updating Generic-Drug Labels Can Take Months, USA TODAY, Apr. 21,
2005, at 3B.
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